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EFFECT OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSE IN LESSEES'
SURRENDER COVENANT
ACOVENANT to surrender demised premises in as good condition as
when received, "loss by fire and ordinary wear and decay excepted," '1
raises the question as to whether the unqualified exculpatory phrase
includes negligently caused fires. Illustrative is United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp.,, a recent Ohio case, in which a lease of
buildings contained such a stipulation, plus a provision that the lessee
would pay to the lessor, in addition to rent, any increase in the cost of
insurance premiums which might be occasioned by the special hazards
of the lessee's occupancy,3 such increase to be limited to premiums for
coverage not exceeding a stated amount. The lessor maintained the in-
surance and, after a fire, received payment from the insurance company,
which, as subrogee of the lessor's right of action, sought to recoup its
loss from the lessee. Although the lessee's negligence was conceded,
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict against plaintiff in-
surance company, holding that the exculpatory phrase had effectively
extinguished both the lessor's right of action and that of its subrogee.
This case points up with graphic clarity the inconclusiveness of a
strictly semantic approach to the interpretive problem involved. By
shifting emphasis, the terminology can, with minimal ingenuity, be
made to assume variant meanings. The majority, by dissection, con-
strued "wear and decay" to be qualified by the adjective "ordinary," and
since no like limitation was made regarding "fire," concluded that all
types of fires must have been intended to be comprehended within the
exception. The dissent, on the other hand, insisted that the phrase must
be read as a unit, with a logical consistency between the two parts, and
since negligence is excluded by implication from one portion, it must
likewise be excluded from the other.4 While it is conceded that ex-
1 Variations of this fairly standard wording are numerous but with slight effect,
so long as "fire" is a named exception. Where the exception is for damages caused
by the "elements," this is generally considered not to include fires caused by any human
agency. 32 AM. JUL, Landlord & Tenant § 811 (194).
2 x66 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.zd 330 (1956).
Growing recognition is being attached to the significance of such a provision. See
note 12, infra.
'The argument is occasionally made that, historically, the tenant is not liable for
damage to the premises due to, accidentally caused fires. 51 C.J.S., Landlord & Tenant
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culpation between private contracting parties violates no vital policy
factors,5 the underlying theory of the dissent in the instant case appears,
nevertheless, to be founded upon historic abhorrence of attempts to
limit liability for negligent acts and would, accordingly, require strict
construction of such provisions.
Where exculpatory language is dear and unequivocal, there is no
room for construction, and the instrument itself should be solely de-
terminative; but where, as in the Phil-Mar case, the contract is am-
biguous, it would seem that resort must be had to circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction and to the commercial background of the
contract in order to determine the true intent of the parties. In cases,
for example, where the premises are not insured against loss by fire,0
the landlord must, of necessity, look only to the common-law liability
of the tenant for recovery of his loss, and in the absence of incon-
trovertible language to the contrary, it is highly unlikely that the land-
lord would be said to have intended by the exceptions in the surrender
covenant, to foreswear this avenue of recovery. On the other hand, this
inference is not so dear in cases where the premises are insured. In as
much as the normal fire insurance policy contains subrogation provisions,7
§ 408 (1947); TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT §§ xxi, iz8 (1940); 32 AM. JuL.
Landlord &? Tenant § Soz (1941). Thus, in order to give the exceptions in the sur-
render covenant some legal effect, the phrase "qoss by fire excepted" must necessarily be
allowed to include negligently caused fires, Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 7
1ll.zd 393, 131 N.E.zd loo (1955). An answer to this suggestion has been given
by pointing out that such a provision does have a legal effect in that it relieves the
tenant's obligation to rebuild when the buildings are destroyed by fire, leaving only
liability in money damages. General Mills v. Goldman, 184 F.zd 359 (195o); Cerny-
Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., supra; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp.,
supra. In Carstens v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 142 Wash. 259, 252 Pac. 939 (1927),
the interesting idea is suggested that this type of clause in leases came into vogue in
England when there was uncertainty as to whether the lessee would be liable even for
accidental fires, and thus does have an intended legal effect without exculpation from
liability for negligence even though the necessity for the clause has ended.
'General Mills v. Goldman, 184 F.zd 359 (195o); Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn
Co. 7 Ill.2d 393, 131 N.E.zd 00 (955) ; Kansas City Stockyards Co. v. A. Reich &
Sons, 25o S.W.zd 692 (Mo. 1952) j Mansfield Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. & St.
L. R. Co., 74 Ohio St. 30, 77 N.E. 269 (19o6). But cf. SWEANY, Validity of Con.
tracts Against Consequences of Negligence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION ON IN-
SURANCE LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASsOCIATION 155 (1948), concerning statutory
prohibition of the lessor's exculpation.
' Brophy v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 98 Neb. 307, z52 N.W. 557 (xg9s) ; Carstens
v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 142 Wash. 259, 252 Pac. 939 (x927).
"Subrogation. This company may require from the insured an assignment of all
right of recovery against any party for loss to the extent that payment therefor is made
by this company." 1943 New York Standard Fire Policy.
the release by the insured of a possible tortfeasor without consent of the
insurer might well jeopardize the right of the insured to recover on the
policy,8 or render the insured liable in damages to the insurer to the
extent of the insurer's consequent loss.9 Accordingly, if a like result
were ascribed to the release of a potential tortfeasor prior to any loss, it
could reasonably be inferred that the lessor did not intend to exculpate
the tenant at the expense of forfeiting fiis right to recovery on the policy.
Nevertheless, a well recognized judicial reluctance to allow technical
language to work a forfeiture of insurance 0 makes such a result un-
likely in the absence of a dear policy provision to that effect; and since
fire insurance policies are generally standardized as to form,"i such a
provision would, indeed, be rare. Thus, it appears that while examina-
tion of the legal effects of equivocal exculpatory clauses may afford
some indicia of the intent of the parties, where insurance is involved,
without other supportive elements, this alone will be inconclusive.
More apposite criteria are found in cases where the courts have
recognized the economic reality that, irrespective of special provision, the
tenant actually pays, as additional rent, the premium cost and should,
therefore, be entitled to the benefit of the insurance." Should it be
8 VANCE, INSURANCE § 134(c) (3rd ed. .951) ; United States Fire Insurance Co.
v. Phil-Mar Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.zd 330 (z956). In reference to the
standard fire policy, the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated: "They [the words
of the subrogation clause] are inserted in the policy, not by the company or by the
plaintiff, but by the statute. To fail to give them force and effect is to nullify the
statute." Buckner v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 209 N.C. 640, 184 S.E. 520 (1936).
' Some courts allow the insurer to be reimbursed out of the amount received, less
costs of recovery to the insured, up to the full amount paid by the insurer; others limit
reimbursement to that amount by which the money received from the wrongdoer, together
with the insurance, exceeds the loss and cost of recovery incurred by the insured. 29
Am. JuR., Insurance § 1346i VANCE, INSURANCE § 134 (3rd ed. 1951 ) ; 2 RICHARDS,
INSURANCE §§ 198, 563 (5th ed. 1952).
"OIn Ensell v. Lumber Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St. 269, o2 N.E. 955 (1913), the policy
contained a stipulation for subrogation and the insured had, by contract prior to the
loss, specifically released the tortfeasor from liability. The court held that such a
stipulation in the policy could only work a forfeiture strictissimi juris; that stipulation
being inserted in the policy by the insurer for his own protection would be construed
most strongly against him and in favor of the insured. See 29 AM. JuR., Insurance
§ 166.
" Forty-four states plus Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia have adopted
the 1943 New York Standard Fire Policy either by ruling of the insurance commis-
sioner or other supervising official, or by legislative enactment. Of the remaining
states, three still use the 1945 Massachusetts Standard Form, and Texas uses its own
distinctive policy. 3 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 497 (Sth ed. 1952).
" Referring to the provision requiring the lessee to pay the extra insurance premiums
occasioned by its occupancy, the court said: "Clearly under this section of thv lease
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denied him, he would be forced, in order to protect himself, to insure
the premises a second time-at best, an uneconomical procedure." Fur-
thermore, although the idea is strongly opposed by insurance companies,
subrogation may more accurately be considered a windfall to the in-
surer than an inherent right. 4 For although it is true that at common
law subrogation is allowed an insurer after payment of the loss, even
without a stipulation to that effect in the policy, 5 the fact remains that
the insurer is paid to assume the risk of loss, and its premium rates are
established accordingly.'" The standard fire insurance policy covers fires
caused by negligence as well as those caused by accident or natural
causes,'7 and premium rates are calculated on the frequency of occur-
rence of all three types, without regard to subrogation rights.' Ac-
cordingly, there is a perceptibly growing leniency displayed toward the
negligent lessee. That this trend is not unopposed, however, is indi-
cated by numerous dissents;' 9 and at least one state has insisted, that an
it was contemplated that the lessor. would carry insurance on the property and look to
the insurance for compensation for any loss by fire." United States Fire Ins. Co. v.
Phil-Mar. Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.zd 330, 333 (1956).
'aIn Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 7 1ll.2d 393, 398, 131 N.E.2d 00o, 103
(19SS) the court says: "Under the construction urged by the lessor it would be neces-
sary for both parties to the lease to carry fire insurance if they are to be protected.
The lessee would have to insure against fires due to his negligence, and the lessor against
fires due to other causes. Whether the kind of policy the lessee would have needed was
commercially available when the present lease was entered into is at least dubious."
Citing 31 BOSTON L. REv. 47 (ig5i), which indicates that such a policy might now be
available.
"' Suggested forcefully in 2 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 183 (sth ed. 1952).
25 29 AM. JuR., Insurance § 13355 VANCE, INSURANCE § 134 (3rd ed. 1951).
1 "The insurance rate on a building, according to insurance authorities, is a reason-
ably accurate reflection of the loss probabilities of that particular class of property."
NOLTING, How MUNICIPAL FIRE DEFENSES AFFECT INSURANCE RATES 50 (1939)5
"The two systems in most common use for schedule rating are the Universal Mercantile
Schedule and the Analytic Schedule. A third system, which undertakes to incorporate
the element of experience, is known as the Experience Grading and Rating Schedule.
This last system has never been actually adopted for use and is, therefore, of little,
practical concern." MAGEE, GENERAL INSURANCE (4 th ed. 1954). See also, PAT-
TERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 122 (1935).
1? GOLDIN, PRINCIPLES OF N4EW YORK STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE POLICY 76
(1938).
18See note 16 supra. But there are indications that interest of fire insurance com-
panies in potential subrogation claims is increasing. See LowRy, Recoveries in Fire
Losses, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION ON INSURANCE LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 199 (1949).
" General Mills v. Goldman, x84 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1950) 5 Cerny-Pickas & Co. v.
C. R. Jahn Co. 7 Ill.zd 393, 131 N.E.zd 100 (i955); United States Fire Ins. Co. v.
Phil-Mar Corp., 166 Ohio St. 85, 139 N.E.2d 330 (1956).
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intention on the part of the landlord to relieve a tenant from liability for
negligent damage to insured premises can never be inferred from
equivocal language 20
In the final analysis, it becomes clear that the contemporary trend
evinces an approach more in keeping with the probable intent of the
parties and the economic realities of the situation than did earlier cases.
Nevertheless, as long as some courts adhere to a purely semantic con-
struction of exculpatory provisions, it will be necessary for lessors and
lessees to adopt self-help measures. The most obvious of these is, of
course, a specific exception of negligently caused fire damage in the sur-
render covenant.21 A more practical device, however, would be that of
including both landlord and tenant as named insureds "as their interests
may appear 2 2  With subrogation against the tenant thus obviated, a
cover-all exception in the surrender covenant would not be objectionable
to the insurer, and by this means, the tenant could block recovery by
the landlord for fire losses in excess of the insurance coverage.
This latter sugge~tion presupposes either willing cooperation be-
tween landlord and tenant, or at least an equality of bargaining power.
Where, however, the relationship between the parties is not on such
a plane, essentially the same result may be had if the lessee covenants
to insure the property for the lessor's benefit and secures an agreed
amount and type of coverage in his own name.23 If the lessor is able
to dictate terms under which the lessee assumes full responsibility for
" "Contracts for exemption from liability for negligence are not favored by the
law, and are strictly construed against the party asserting it. The contract will never
be so interpreted in the absence of clear and specific words that such was the intent of
the parties." Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co., 238 N. C. 589, 596, 79 S.E.zd
185, 19o (1953)0
2A normal inspection of the risk would doubtless include an examination of
the terms of the lease, and such a provision would be likely to cause objection by
the insurer. Further, insertion of such a clause in a lease drawn after the issuance of
the policy would be derogatory to the rights of the insured. The analogy of the
insurer to a surety is drawn in 6 VAND. L. REV. 408 (1953), noting Kansas City
Stockyards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, 250 S.W.zd 69z (Mo. 1952). See also Remarks
of John M. Breen, INSURANCE SERIES, No. 97, AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
(1952).
"2 It is well settled that both have an insurable interest. GOLDIN, PRINCIPLES OF
THE NEW YORK STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE POLICY 26 (1938); VANCE, INSURANCE
§ 29 (3rd. ed. 1951 ) j ; RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 78 (5th ed. 1952).
3 "And a tenant who has agreed verbally to keep the demised property insured is
liable to the lessor for a breach of that agreement, and has an insurable interest in the
property to the extent of the amount agreed to be insured." Berry v. American Cent.
Ins. Co., 13z N.Y. 49, 56, 3 a N.E. 254, 255 (1892).
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the property, protection may be had for the lessee through a full-
coverage type of liability insurance against loss or damage.24
It would appear that under either of the arrangements described, the
total cost of the' insurance to the lessor and lessee would be about the
same as it would be to a lessor who maintained the policy alone; but,
in addition, the protection to both parties would be more effective, and
the likelihood of litigation in the event of loss reduced.
" Sinnott, Insurance Covering Contractually Assumed Liability, INSURANCE SERIES,
No. 97, AMERcAN MANAGEMENT AssociATION.
